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HOMO POST-SOVETICUS: AN ATTEMPT OF ANALYSIS ON THE BASE  
OF POST KEYNESIAN AND OLD INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 
 
Introduction. The thesis that the institutions of the 
post-Soviet Russian economy do not correspond to the 
institutions of a "normal" market economy has long 
been commonplace. Among the various explanations of 
such a “discrepancy”, in our opinion, so far not enough 
attention has been paid to the analysis of the main ste- 
reotypes and norms of the economic behavior of the 
“post-Soviet Russians”1. This work aims to fill this gap. 
The methodological basis of the research is the va- 
rious elements of Old Institutionalism and Post Keyne- 
sian Economics (branch of Keynesian "tree" very close 
to Old Institutionalism). 
The specificity of the approach proposed in the pa-
per is that those characteristics of economic behavior 
that are interpreted as constants in neoclassical theory 
(and in mainstream economics, in general) are treated as 
changing variables, and such variability requires institu-
tional analysis. These constants, in our opinion, include 
the following characteristics of economic behavior. 
A) Full rationality. In the neoclassical theory, it is 
usually assumed that in the process of decision-making, 
economic agents consider all benefits and costs of each 
of the possible choices. Thus, they fully take into ac-
count the existing constraints and opportunities. As a re-
sult, agents choose the optimal solution. That is why 
complete rationality means optimization. All modern 
mainstream economic models are based on this assump-
tion. Here the “constant” is the fullness of rationality, its 
highest degree: all characteristics of all possible choices 
are taken into account (see for more details Avtonomov, 
1998; 2017).  
The concept of bounded rationality was a slight de-
parture from this premise. This concept was developed 
within the framework of Old Institutionalism and Post 
Keynesian economics (Rutherford, 1995; Lavoie, 
1993), but it was introduced by O. Williamson (1975) in 
the mid-1970s into the framework of mainstream eco-
nomics2. The point is that the counting and cognitive 
abilities of people are limited, so they cannot take into 
account all constraints and opportunities during the de-
cision-making process. We will discuss it below.  
B) A simple adherence to self-interest. In the neo-
classical theory, it is usually assumed that each agent 
pursues his personal interest (as an “egoist”), but does 
                                                        
1 We apply concept of “Homo Post-Soveticus” only to the Post-Soviet Russians, but not to the Ukrainians, the Kazakhs, 
the Lithuanians etc.   
2 According to mainstream economics bounded rationality is consistent with maximization; heterodox economists believe 
that people characterized by bounded rationality do not optimize.  
not violate the rights and interests of others through the 
violation of legal and moral norms. A departure from 
this constant is the concept of opportunism proposed by 
O. Williamson (1975) – and developed by us (it will be 
discussed in the relevant section). 
The following discussion focuses on constants, 
from which neoclassicists (according to our opinion) 
have never retreated. 
C) Normal estimate of the future time. In the neo-
classical theory, it is usually assumed that each agent 
values the present time more than the future, which is 
expressed in the positive rate of time preferences. How-
ever, at the same time, economic events (flows of 
money, goods, resources, assets) of the future time still 
have value for it. Both of these prerequisites are embo- 
died in principle, according to which the agent discounts 
future variables at a positive and constant rate of dis-
count. 
D) Independence of preferences from restrictions. 
In the neoclassical theory it is usually assumed that the 
preferences of each agent are formed by him inde-
pendently and do not depend on any restrictions, both 
financial and social (Avtonomov, 1998. S. 126 – 130; 
139 – 140). The simplest example is the consumer be-
havior model, in which the indifference curves and the 
budget constraint line are determined by completely dif-
ferent factors. 
E) Autonomy of expectations. The modern neoclas-
sical theory uses the hypothesis of rational expectations. 
According to this hypothesis, each agent forms its own 
expectations, independently collecting, processing and 
using all available information (Avtonomov, 1998.  
S. 162 – 163). This implies, in particular, that the expec-
tations of each agent do not depend on the expectations 
of other agents. 
F) Personal responsibility. In modern neoclassical 
theory, it is assumed that each agent seeks to fulfil their 
obligations to other agents. 
In our opinion, it is useful to combine the last three 
constants with the help of the term behavioral independ-
ence or behavioral autonomy. In other words, the agent 
demonstrates behavioral autonomy, if his or her prefer-
ences do not depend on restrictions, expectations are 
formed autonomously, and he or she shows personal  
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responsibility in fulfilling his obligations. The relevant 
section will discuss it in more detail. 
It is these characteristics that form the modern ne-
oclassical interpretation of the economic man – Homo 
Economicus. We believe that none of the above charac-
teristics is applicable for the correct interpretation of the 
economic behavior of "post-Soviet Russians"1. It seems 
to us that such a description can be given by rejecting 
these assumptions. Such a refusal just means we will 
treat these described constants of economic behavior as 
the changing variables (regarding constant and variable 
rationality see Avtonomov, 2017). 
Lowered Rationality. People behave fully ratio- 
nally only in neoclassical economic theory. In heterodox 
theories, as in real life, rationality is often bounded. The 
low degree of rationality is interpreted by us (following 
H. Leibenstein, 1976) as a low propensity to “calculate” 
(possible benefits and costs of decision-making). “An 
absence of tendency toward prudence” may be due ei-
ther to reasons that impede such calculations, or to rea-
sons that make them unnecessary (first of all, through 
breaking the link between efforts and results). 
To the first group of causes, we include external 
informational constraints. We imply situations of lack of 
information (uncertainty of the future), or its extensive-
ness, or its complexity (see in details Hodgson, 1997). 
To the second group of causes, we attribute factors due 
to the specifics of previous economic systems that  
existed in a given country, as well as various non-eco-
nomic factors, in particular, of a geographical and cul-
tural nature. It should be borne in mind that all these fac-
tors can interact with each other. Consider first the role 
of external informational constraints. 
Generally speaking, the "transitivity" of any econ-
omy indicates the variability of its institutional environ-
ment. It is important because the Post-Soviet Russian 
economy can be treated as “transitional” or “post-tran-
sitional” system. Institutions of the former economic 
system are being destroyed, and their place is taken by 
institutions of the new system. So, the economy in tran-
sition is system with a changing institutional environ-
ment. How does the changing institutional environment 
affect the “external informational constraints” men-
tioned? The answer is obvious - negatively, in the sense 
that abrupt institutional changes increase both the uncer-
tainty of the future and the complexity of information. 
Firstly, drastic changes in the institutional environ-
ment make it difficult for economic agents to predict 
both the actions and reactions of other agents and the 
future economic environment in general. In short, the 
degree of uncertainty of the future becomes higher in the 
“transitional” conditions, and begins to decline only 
                                                        
1 Generally speaking, these characteristics are hardly applicable for the correct interpretation of the actual behavior of 
actually existing agents in Western countries. However, we believe that, for a number of reasons discussed below, the behavior 
of the “post-Soviet Russians” differs from the neoclassical model “Homo Economicus” in a more degree. In any case, the 
analysis proposed in the paper is aimed at forming a methodological basis for creating a “theoretical model of man”, that is an 
alternative to the model developed in the framework of neoclassical approach. 
when the institutions of the type of economic system to 
which this economy "moves" have been largely formed. 
In principle, the allegations of a sharp increase in the 
degree of uncertainty of the future in the Post-Soviet 
Russian economy have long become commonplace and 
do not need any evidence. Here, however, the fact that 
such an increase acted as a serious barrier to rationality 
of economic agents in the 1990s is important. 
Secondly, during the transition to the economic 
system of a new type, economic agents have to deal with 
such information that they have never dealt with before. 
A vivid example is the emergence of stock markets in a 
transitional economy. The behavior of people in such 
markets in the early years of the “transition” could not 
be rational, as economic agents were faced with the 
completely new information for themselves, because 
there were no such markets in the planned economy. An 
analysis of the balance of issuing companies, under-
standing the links between the macroeconomic situation 
and the situation in the stock market and its segments – 
such things went beyond the competence of stock mar-
ket participants in economies that started a “transition”. 
Therefore, the collapse of these markets in Russia, Al-
bania and some other countries with a “transitional 
economy” was not accidental (Bezemer, 2001). Another 
example of increasing the degree of “complexity of in-
formation” is consumer goods markets. For decades, 
Russian consumers have been living in a shortage of 
many basic necessities, and then suddenly they encoun-
ter dozens and hundreds (if not thousands) of previously 
unknown varieties of food, clothing, shoes, household 
appliances, etc. It is clear that this is a case of informa-
tional complexity (as well as its extensiveness). Making 
completely rational decisions in such situations proves 
impossible (Hodgson, 1997). 
In general, the Russian transitional economy was 
characterized, at least in the 1990s, by very high degrees 
of complexity (as well as extensiveness) of information 
and uncertainty of the future, which severely con-
strained the rationality of the behavior of economic 
agents. In the 2000-2010s, these factors largely retained 
their strength. For example, the degree of complexity of 
information has continued and continues to rise, largely 
due to the very rapid development of the sectors related 
to information and communication. Some young people 
may not keep up with these changes, and their skills are 
insufficient to collect and process the data necessary for 
rational decision-making. 
Among other factors leading to the uselessness of 
optimization, first of all, the influence of the economic 
system of planned socialism should be highlighted. The 
Soviet power, through a system of centrally planned 
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economy, seriously discouraged a penchant for pru-
dence and personal economic independence. On the one 
hand, it guaranteed a certain minimum set of benefits to 
the Soviet person regardless of his efforts (and the en-
terprises were generally under soft budget constraints); 
on the other hand, it did not allow him or her to increase 
her personal material well-being above a certain level. 
Such state paternalism instilled dependency attitudes 
among the majority of the Soviet population and made 
prudent behavior meaningless. Thus, perhaps, the Soviet 
power managed to create a "new socialist man" (Kregel, 
1995), "Homo Soveticus", and more so than the govern-
ments of Eastern European countries, where the system 
of the planned economy, which adversely affects the de-
gree of rationality, existed almost half as much. 
Finally, among other similar reasons, a low pro-
pensity to “calculate” can be attributed to the geograph-
ical environment: in the past, frequent crop failures in 
rural areas also led to a gap between efforts and results. 
However, as urbanization proceeded, this factor lost its 
significance, and the low degree of rationality of Homo 
Post-Soveticus is hardly connected with it. 
Opportunism. Opportunism was defined by  
O. Williamson as “self-interest seeking with guile” 
(Williamson, 1975. P. 55), that is, as an excessive degree 
of adherence to personal interest. This interpretation 
contrasts opportunism with “a simple adherence to self-
interest.” We have already written about it above, and 
O. Williamson defines him as such behavior in which an 
economic agent seeks personal gain without impairing 
the rights of other agents, but without focusing on their 
interests. It is this characteristic of human behavior that 
was tacitly assumed in almost all economic theory (not 
only neoclassical one). 
In our opinion, it is important that the degree of ad-
herence to personal interest, as well as the degree of ra-
tionality, can be a variable quantity. The degree of op-
portunism itself can change (although O. Williamson 
and his followers do not write about this). 
We believe that the degree of opportunism is deter-
mined by institutional factors, and, above all, by that 
group of these factors which is related to the behavior of 
the state. We mean, firstly, how much the state performs 
its main institutional function related to the protection of 
contracts, and, secondly, what kind of social ideology it 
forms (or has already formed). 
If the state effectively protects contracts, punishing 
their violators, that it forms a social ideology that en-
courages honest, constructive work; if it discourages in-
centives to “use guile” and favors “hard work”, then the 
degree of opportunism will be low. Agents will have 
neither incentives nor the ability to "overly pursue their 
self-interest." Unfortunately, in post-Soviet Russia eve-
rything was different. We argue that the post-Soviet 
Russian state was characterized by institutional inade-
                                                        
1 A business lobby estimates the damages at around 22 billion roubles, see Night of the Long Scoops (2018). 
quacy, that is, by the inability or unwillingness to per-
form its basic institutional functions, and, above all, to 
ensure the smooth operation of the contracting system. 
Firstly, the post-Soviet Russian state extremely 
poorly defends contracts. To a large extent, this is a con-
sequence of the underdevelopment of the judicial legal 
system and (typical for Russia) dominance of the exe- 
cutive power over other branches of power. For exam-
ple, such phenomena as the absence in laws of the defi-
nition of mechanisms for their implementation, the non-
enforceability of laws, an ambiguity of the formulations 
contained in their texts, the incompatibility of different 
laws with each other and “legal void” (such as the pres-
ence in one law of reference to another law which is ab-
sent) represented a common place in the 1990s and often 
occur in the 2000-2010s. Moreover, the Russian state 
often violated and violates its own obligations regarding 
a protection of property rights and contracts. The most 
striking recent example is famous Night of the Long 
Sсoops – mass demolition of kiosk-like structures in 
Moscow in 2016 February.1 The phrase of Moscow’s 
major Sergei Sobyanin about the attempts to recover 
losses “one cannot hide behind property papers” – to-
gether with his subsequent success at 2018 elections – is 
the direct proof of the Russian government’s institu-
tional inadequacy.  
Secondly, the post-Soviet Russian state contributed 
to the formation of a social ideology that stimulates op-
portunistic behavior. To understand this, you must 
firstly make relevant definition. By social ideology, we 
understand the system of social goals and preferences, 
which largely influences the goals and preferences of in-
dividuals. The very same social ideology is in complex 
relations of mutual dependence with the informal rules 
of the game and has a huge impact on human behavior, 
ranging from the degree of adherence to self-interest and 
ending with macroeconomic decisions (such as the pro-
pensity to save). 
In economic history, as an illustration of the eco-
nomic role of social ideology, first of all, we can distin-
guish the period of development of capitalism in the 
XVII-XIX centuries in a number of Protestant coun-
tries – first of all in the USA and Switzerland – where 
the ethics of extreme Protestant sects (“Puritan ethics”) 
dominated. The essence of this ethic was the ideology of 
"worldly asceticism": a combination of maximum ef-
forts in the production sector (huge working efforts in 
all forms, including entrepreneurship, rapid accumula-
tion of capital) and severe restrictions in the consumer 
sphere (relatively small amounts of consumption and a 
small amount of time spent on leisure). At the same 
time, this ethics stimulated honest behavior in economic 
life and maximum responsibility while observing con-
tractual obligations. Thus, the Puritan ethics provided a 
very large incentive to work, entrepreneurship, savings 
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and investments, which had a positive impact on eco-
nomic growth, in particular, and on the emergence of 
Western capitalism as an effective economic system, in 
general. 
Another example of the powerful influence of so-
cial ideology on economic behavior is communist ideo- 
logy in the USSR and some other totalitarian states of 
the twentieth century. There is no doubt that one of the 
reasons for the rapid economic development of the 
USSR in the 1920s and 1950s – along with the most bru-
tal methods of state coercion and the abundance of re-
sources – was Stalin’s ideology which regarded work as 
a “matter of honor, valor and heroism”1. Thus, the So-
viet economy in the specified period of time was distin-
guished by a very high work / leisure ratio and the ab-
sence of aspects of “shirking,” which, of course, stimu-
lated economic development. On the other hand, the 
slowdown in the 1970s and 1980s was to a certain extent 
caused by the implicit penetration into the Soviet ideo- 
logy of motives of dependency and avoidance of “hard-
working activity” – this was embodied in the well-
known maxim: “They pretend that we are paid for pre-
tend to be working." 
In our opinion, the dramatic events that took place 
in the 1990s in the Post-Soviet Russia economy can also 
be largely explained by the peculiarities of group beha- 
vior associated with social ideology. The fact is that at 
the turn of the 1980-1990s, during the collapse of the 
USSR and the establishment of Russia as a country with 
a market economy, a radical change in social ideology 
took place. Communist values were sharply "disman-
tled." 
There was a huge ideological vacuum. It quickly 
began to fill with aggressive propaganda in the state me-
dia of “bourgeois values”, or rather, with propaganda of 
quick, immediate enrichment at any cost, consumption 
of expensive, prestigious goods and, in general, “beau-
tiful life”. The new social ideology, the ideology of the 
“luxury life”, which was actively implemented through 
all media, had a powerful influence on the goals and 
preferences of the majority of economic agents of the 
Post-Soviet Russian economy. The most common con-
sequence of planting such a social ideology was the gen-
eral disregard for honest creative work. “Heroes of the 
day” were prostitutes, financial speculators, or simply 
notorious bandits. Those who did not directly become a 
“criminal element” received great incentives for oppor-
tunistic behavior. In the 2000-2010s many bandits and 
frauds became the part of the State bureaucracy, and the 
problems of opportunistic behavior has been deepened. 
Investor Myopia. As a rule, when making a 
choice, people try – one way or another – to take into 
account the consequences of their decisions not only in 
the very near future, but also in the distant one. In this 
case, the closer the period of receipt of money (or deli- 
very of goods), the better. This aspect reflects, as noted 
                                                        
1 But, nevertheless, we treat the Stalin’s regime as criminal and flagitious! 
above, a positive rate of time preferences, embodied in 
the “subjective discount rate”, as well as a positive in-
terest rate. All this means that the more distant in time 
flows of money or goods are discounted, taking into ac-
count the “increase” of the same discount rate (interest 
rate). It reflects, as we have already written, a “normal 
estimate of the future time”. It is a consequence from the 
prerequisite of a normal estimate of the future time that 
the vast majority of economic models, and not only 
those related to the mainstream economics, proceed. 
However, in a situation of higher uncertainty, for 
example, due to the institutional inadequacy of the state 
or a sharp transformation of the economic system, an es-
timate of the future will be distorted. Revenues of highly 
distant future periods will be even less preferable for 
people than in the “ordinary situation”. Then people will 
discount such income at an increasing discount rate, 
which means a short-term temporary orientation or just 
short-termism (Dickerson et al, 1995). In other words, 
each subsequent period will be discounted at a higher 
discount rate than the previous one. 
An even greater degree of uncertainty can distort 
an estimate of the future even more, leading to investor 
myopia. Investor myopia is an exception from conside- 
ration of material and cash flows for certain future pe-
riods, which should occur later than a certain threshold 
point in time (Bellais, 2004; Juniper, 2000; Rozmainsky, 
2015). In other words, investor myopia is discounting 
future variables at an infinite discount rate, starting from 
a certain threshold point. The described phenomenon is 
quite natural in “abnormal” situations such as the lack 
of protection of forward contracts, inconsistency of the 
legislative base of the economy or high socio-political 
instability (it is clear that all of them are related to the 
above-mentioned institutional inadequacy of the state). 
It should be clear that investor myopia inevitably 
gives rise to and / or intensifies the decline in invest-
ment, because it means a very short time range for mak-
ing decisions. After all, in fact, those investments in 
fixed capital (and other assets) that can generate income 
only after a long time period, are out of consideration if 
this period of time comes after a certain threshold point 
in time. 
Thus, the consequences of investor myopia are ob-
vious: people exposed to this “disease” refuse to invest 
with a long payback period. There is no accumulation of 
many important types of physical and human capital, 
technical development, and diffusion of innovations. An 
economic system with an excessively low estimate of the 
future time is doomed to stagnation or, at best, to low 
growth rates. 
Investor myopia can be quite easily generated (by 
the already mentioned institutional inadequacy of the 
state, which generates a high degree of uncertainty of 
the future), but it is difficult to overcome. The fact is that 
it is deeply rooted in the psychology and behavior of 
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people. There are many examples of this, and perhaps 
the most convincing of them is the economic behavior 
of Russians in the post-Soviet period. It was investor 
myopia that was one of the most important factors that 
triggered fixed capital investment collapse during the 
1990s in post-Soviet Russia. It is also one of the most 
important factors that led to the fact that the average age 
of equipment in the domestic economy increased from 
10.8 years in 1990 to 21 years in 2004 (beyond 2004 this 
statistics became unavailable). Unfortunately, the pro-
cess of technological degradation continues in the 2000-
2010s. 
In general, a low degree of rationality, (strong) op-
portunism and investor myopia can be interpreted as in-
terrelated "links of one chain", especially since investor 
myopia can be viewed as a special case of a low "pro-
pensity to calculate", as well as a specific reaction to op-
portunism. Low “propensity to calculate” (as well as, to 
a certain extent, investor myopia), in turn, can be both a 
cause and a consequence of behavioral dependency dis-
cussed in the following section. 
Behavioral Dependency. In order to understand 
what behavioral dependency is, it is necessary again to 
look in more detail at the opposite of this characteristic – 
behavioral independence or behavioral autonomy. The 
absence of this term in the mainstream economics is ex-
plained by the fact that this property is taken in it as a 
“plain truth”. In other words, those agents who are con-
sidered in neoclassical theories and concepts of other 
scientific traditions that fit into the mainstream (new 
Keynesianism, new institutionalism, etc.) are characte- 
rized by behavioral autonomy, that is, personal inde-
pendence in shaping preferences and expectations, as 
well as in the fulfillment of its obligations. More speci- 
fically, the agent is behaviorally independent if the fol-
lowing conditions are satisfied. 
Firstly, his or her preferences are formed inde-
pendently of the existing restrictions, both financial 
(budgetary) and “social/class”. "Neoclassical agent" 
does not suffer from "green grape syndrome". He or she 
does not cut back on his or her needs just because he or 
she earns little, or because society (class) has inspired 
him or her that these needs are “inadequate.” Although 
"the phenomenon of reduced needs due to reduced op-
portunities to meet them has been described by a number 
of researchers." (Avtonomov, 1998. S. 127). We empha-
size that in the number of restrictions we include not 
only (and maybe not even so much) prices and income, 
but also those stereotypes and norms that are imposed 
on an individual by the society or class to which he or 
she belongs. We refer to stereotypes and norms in rela-
tion to consumption, savings, portfolio choice, labor 
supply, etc. The representative agent described by main-
stream economics has stable preferences independent of 
such restrictions. His or her preferences do not depend 
not only on financial receipts (and payments), but, 
which is, in our opinion, more important, on society. 
It should also be noted that the independence of 
preferences from (financial and social/class) restrictions 
is something broader than the absence of “external im-
pacts on utility” described in the famous article by  
H. Leibenstein (1950). We mean the bandwagon effect, 
the snob effect and Veblen effect. The fact is that such 
external impacts on utility refer to the so-called “non-
functional demand”. By this term, economists imply the 
demand that is not directly determined by the quality of 
the product. If there are external influences on the uti- 
lity, the agent buys the product because it is being 
bought (or not bought) by other agents, or because the 
product has a higher price (signaling “prestige”) than 
other products. 
The existence of such external influences, of 
course, creates difficulties in the transition from indivi- 
dual to market demand curves (and in general does not 
correspond to the “standard” neoclassical approach), but 
it is by no means the main factor in the dependence of 
preferences on constraints. Such dependence means that 
the agent begins to perceive the quality of the goods dif-
ferently under the influence of restrictions, and then his 
“functional demand”, that is, the demand due to these 
qualities, changes. 
Secondly, agent's expectations are also formed by 
him or her independently, or, in other words, autono-
mously. We mean that these expectations are based on 
information received and processed by him or her per-
sonally, and not on following the rumors and conjec-
tures of other agents. Autonomy of expectations is com-
patible not only with the rational expectations hypothe-
sis mentioned above, but also with the equally well-
known adaptive expectations hypothesis, which is still 
sometimes used in neoclassical theory. But, it is incom-
patible with the theory of conventional expectations, de-
veloped by J. M. Keynes (1937). In other words, the in-
dependence of expectations means that the agent, while 
forming them, does not focus on the average opinion. 
He or she does not use it as a substitute for inde-
pendently collected and processed information. 
Thirdly, in fulfilling their obligations, the agent is 
characterized by personal responsibility. He or she does 
not fulfill his or her obligations only if it brings him or 
her certain benefits. Generally speaking, personal  
responsibility is closely interrelated with rationality of 
behavior. We refer to the fact that the propensity to cal-
culate costs and benefits is both a cause and a conse-
quence of the agent's personal commitment to his or her 
partners. It is unlikely that he or she will be able to fulfil 
these obligations flawlessly if he or she does not behave 
rationally. At the same time, rational behavior contri- 
butes to personal responsibility (of course, in conditions 
of a low degree of opportunism). In a broader sense, 
“high degree of personal responsibility” means the ten-
dency of an agent to bear the burden of personal obliga-
tions to other agents. 
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Thus, as we have already written, behavioral  
autonomy means independence of preferences from con-
straints, autonomy of expectations and personal respon-
sibility. All these aspects are admitted as an obvious 
truth in mainstream economics, and first of all, in the 
framework of the neoclassical approach. “An economic 
person is characterized by the relative immutability of 
his preferences, the way environmental information is 
being processed, and the way expectations are formed.” 
(Avtonomov, 1998. S. 32). However, when analyzing 
the behavior characteristics of “Homo Post-Soveticus”, 
this approach is not suitable. We argue that behavioral 
autonomy is not a “default” property of a typical post-
Soviet Russian. 
On the contrary, the most important characteristic 
of “Homo Post-Soveticus” is behavioral dependence. In 
other words, we believe that typical post-Soviet Rus-
sians are characterized by the dependence of prefe- 
rences on financial and social class restrictions, non-
autonomy of expectations in the form of a tendency to 
herd behavior during their formation and personal irre-
sponsibility, leading to non-fulfillment of obligations. 
The causes of the behavioral non-independence of 
Homo Post-Soveticus are rooted in its Soviet past. Such 
reasons include the above-considered state paternalism 
and soft budget constraints, characteristic of the Soviet 
economy. As was again noted, these features formed de-
pendent behavioral attitudes among Soviet people. In 
addition, the subordination of the interests of an indivi- 
dual to the interests of society is often considered as an 
element the traditional Russian economic culture. Per-
haps, collectivism and authoritarianism can be factors of 
behavioral dependency that go back to the distant past. 
It is through the concept of behavioral dependency 
that the “adverse” phenomena of the post-Soviet Rus-
sian economy can be explained, such as massive invest-
ments of ordinary citizens in financial pyramids, con-
sumption of low-quality goods under the influence of 
advertising, as well as massive violations and non-ful-
fillment of contractual obligations. These phenomena 
were common in the 1990-2000s and are important now. 
Is Typical Post-Soviet Russian Agent “Homo 
Post-Soveticus”? Here we would like to present some 
quote from one sociological study of young generation’s 
values and preferences: “Our students ... by and large, 
our young customers-consumers are a very peculiar 
combination of personal characteristics. Internal and ex-
ternal neuroticity, narcissism, high self-conceit, Napo-
leon complex, uncritical attitude towards oneself, hyper-
activity and overdeterminism alternating with depres-
sions and falling activity, lack of labor discipline and 
sustainability in solving life tasks, irresistible commit-
ment to unlimited choice and enumeration of contacts 
and perspectives without fixing on any of them. What 
economic behavior can we expect from this genera-
tion?” (Ermishina). 
Let analyze it using the theory proposed above. 
“Narcissism”, “high self-conceit”, “lack of labor dis- 
cipline” are clearly compatible with the “low degree of 
personal responsibility” described by us, and also with 
opportunism. 
“Lack of sustainability in solving life tasks” is 
compatible with a focus on quick returns from economic 
activity, and from here, “hand in hand”, to investor  
myopia. 
"Commitment to the choice ... without fixing on 
any of them" is clearly compatible with the low degree 
of rationality. A high degree of rationality, suggesting 
optimization, is not conceivable just without fixing at 
the best, optimal choice. 
The standard neoclassical model – “Homo Eco-
nomicus” – should correspond to such qualities as 
“commitment to choice with fixation on its specific op-
tions”, “presence of labor discipline”, “normal degree of 
self-esteem” (rather than “self-conceit” and “narcis-
sism”) and “high degree of sustainability in solving life 
tasks”. 
We believe that the fundamental difference bet-
ween the “younger generations of the Post-Soviet Rus-
sians” and the old ones really lie in greater egoism, in-
dividualism, obsession with themselves and their prob-
lems, narcissism, neuroticism, etc. However, only indi-
vidualism and egoism are not enough to get closer to the 
Homo Economicus model. Such qualities as the ten-
dency to prudence/propensity to calculate, patience in 
anticipation of future results (embodied in a “normal es-
timate of the future time”), a high tendency to personal 
responsibility, and the ability to form independent pre- 
ferences are necessary. In short, Discipline, Calculation, 
Patience and Responsibility are the most important cha- 
racteristics of Homo Economicus. However, these qua- 
lities are absent in the new generations of the Post-So-
viet Russians even to a greater degree than in represen- 
tatives of older generations (It remains an open question 
about how adequate these qualities are for modern West-
ern people, and accordingly, how well the neoclassical 
model of man works in the Western world). 
Conclusion.  We conclude that the stereotypes and 
behavioral norms of post-Soviet Russians that were 
formed by the beginning of the 21st century are not con-
gruent to the formal institutions of an efficient market 
economy. These stereotypes and norms do not contri- 
bute to effective and rational decision-making, compli-
ance with laws and contracts, honesty in business rela-
tions, and production activities focused on long-term re-
sults. A typical “Homo Post-Soveticus” is an agent cha- 
racterized by a low degree of rationality, a high degree 
of adherence to self-interest (opportunism), investor 
myopia and behavioral dependence. These characteris-
tics condition and strengthen each other. Some excep-
tion is only the direct correlation between opportunism 
and behavioral dependency: the latter of these pheno- 
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mena is unlikely to lead to significant opportunism, sug-
gesting the opposition of personal interests to a collec-
tive one. However, investor myopia and a low degree of 
rationality “together” give rise to compatibility between 
opportunism and behavioral dependency. 
As a result, decisions made by typical “Homo Post-
Soveticus” lead, at the micro level, to inefficient alloca-
tion of resources, and at the macro level to low or de-
creasing investments in fixed and health capital, as well 
as technological degradation (or, at least, technological 
stagnation). Here it is necessary to note the following. 
Micro- and macroeconomic models created within the 
framework of mainstream economics are hardly ade-
quate for analyzing both individual markets and the 
macroeconomy, if there are agents on such markets and 
in such an economy whose behavioral characteristics 
correspond to “Homo Post-Soveticus”. Models that take 
into account the simultaneous coexistence of low ration-
ality, opportunism, investor myopia and behavioral de-
pendency are needed. 
In addition, as a result, the economy populated by 
such agents turns into a set of closed local relations and 
groups. The degree of mutual trust between agents with 
described behavioral features in such an economy is 
very low, and, accordingly, such an economy is charac-
terized by a low degree of “transparency”. 
It is logical to name such economic system “fa- 
mily-clannish” as opposed to the market system. The 
above features hinder diffusion of innovations, techno-
logical progress and, of course, intensive economic 
growth. In general, “family-clannish capitalism” is 
doomed to economic stagnation and lag behind “nor-
mal”, “market capitalism” due to an unfavorable institu-
tional environment. One of the most important aspects 
of such an environment is precisely the stereotypes and 
norms of agents' behavior that form it, which were con-
sidered in this paper. 
The main practical conclusion is that one can enter 
the trajectory of rapid and sustainable economic growth 
only when transforming the considered characteristics 
of economic behavior. It cannot do without overcoming 
the institutional inadequacy of the state and the deep re-
forms of formal institutions. 
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Розмаїнський І. В. Homo Post-Soveticus: 
Спроба аналізу на основі посткейнсіанского та 
інституційного підходів. 
Основна ідея статті полягає в тому, що пове- 
дінка типового пострадянського росіянина не відпо-
відає моделі людини, запропонованої у неокласич-
ній економічній теорії. Автор статті розглядає такі 
важливі відхилення від цієї моделі, як обмежена ра-
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ціональність, опортунізм, інвестиційна короткозо-
рість і поведінкова несамостійність. Основні при-
чини для таких відхилень пов'язані з невизначені-
стю, а також складністю інформації. Ці зовнішні ін-
формаційні обмежувачі є наслідком інституційних 
змін в пострадянській Росії в цілому та інституцій-
ній неадекватності російської влади зокрема. Теоре-
тична основа статті – посткейнсіанство і старий ін-
ституціоналізм. 
Ключові слова: раціональність, обмежена ра- 
ціональність, опортунізм, інвестиційна короткозо-
рість, поведінкова несамостійність, невизначеність. 
 
Розмаинский И. В. Homo Post-Soveticus: По-
пытка анализа на основе посткейнсианского и 
институционального подходов 
Основная идея статьи состоит в том, что пове-
дение типичного постсоветского россиянина не со-
ответствует модели человека, предлагаемой нео-
классической экономической теорией. Автор статьи 
рассматривает такие важные отклонения от этой мо-
дели, как ограниченная рациональность, оппорту-
низм, инвестиционная близорукость и поведенче-
ская несамостоятельность. Основные причины для 
таких отклонений связаны с неопределённостью, а 
также сложностью информации. Эти внешние ин-
формационные ограничители являются следствием 
институциональных изменений в постсоветской  
 
 
России в целом и институциональной неадекватно-
сти российских властей, в частности. Теоретическая 
основа статьи – посткейнсианство и старый инсти-
туционализм. 
Ключевые слова: рациональность, ограничен-
ная рациональность, оппортунизм, инвестиционная 
близорукость, поведенческая несамостоятельность, 
неопределённость. 
 
Rozmainsky I. Homo Post-Soveticus: An At-
tempt of Analysis on the Base of Post Keynesian and 
Old Institutionalist Approaches 
The main idea of the paper is that a behavior of typ-
ical Post-Soviet Russian agent is inconsistent with the 
model of man offered by Neoclassical Economics. Au-
thor of the paper considers important deviations from 
this model such as bounded rationality, opportunism, in-
vestor myopia and behavioral dependency. The main 
reasons for these deviations are concerned with uncer-
tainty and informational complexity. These external in-
formational constraints are consequences of institutional 
changes in the Post-Soviet Russia, in general, and insti-
tutional inadequacy of the Russian authorities, in parti- 
cular. The theoretical foundations of this paper are Post 
Keynesianism and Old Institutionalism. 
Keywords: rationality, bounded rationality, oppor-
tunism, investor myopia, behavioral dependency, uncer-
tainty. 
 
Received by the editors: 26.11.2018 
and final form 14.12.2018 
  
